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INTRODUCTION
When a taxpayer recovers or collects an item that was de-
ducted in an earlier year, he is ordinarily taxed on the amount
received unless the prior deduction was of no "tax benefit" be-
cause it did not reduce his tax liability.' Because each year's in-
come tax return must be based on the facts as known during that
year,2 the deduction in complete good faith of amounts that are
recovered in later years is a familiar phenomenon. Creditors, for
example, often deduct claims against debtors when they appear to
be worthless but subsequently collect part or all of the debt when
the debtor's financial circumstances unexpectedly improve. An-
other example is a claim against the taxpayer, such as a local
property tax or an employee's salary, which is deducted when paid
but recovered in part when subsequent events establish that the
taxpayer paid more than he actually owed.
In the early days of the federal income tax, it was not clear
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1. See generally Jones & Pratt, The Minimum Tax." Tax Preference Items and the
Tax Benefit Rule, 55 TAXES 321 (1977); Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1943); Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Tomorrow, 57 HARV. L. REV.
675 (1944); Tye, The Tax Benefit Doctrine Reexamined, 3 TAX L. REV. 329 (1948);
Note, The Tax Benefit Rule, Claim of Right Restorations, and Annual Accounting: .4
Curefor the Inconsistencies, 21 VAND. L. REV. 995 (1968); Comment, The Tax Benefit
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2. Lexmont Corp. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 185, 191 (1953); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.461-1(a)(3) (1960).
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that the taxpayer was required to report income on recovering
these previously deducted amounts. If the deduction was errone-
ous when taken, of course, the IRS could assess a deficiency for
the year in which the error occurred (assuming action before the
year was closed by the statute of limitations); 3 but if the deduction
was justified on' the facts as then known, it could not be retroac-
tively disallowed, even if the statute of limitations had not run. As
for the year of recovery, it was sometimes thought anomalous to
require income to be reported when taxpayers merely collected
amounts that were owing to them, or received refunds of amounts
that had been paid by mistake, especially since Eisner v.
Macomber defined the term "income" as used in the sixteenth
amendment and the tax law as "gain derived from capital, from
labor, or from both combined. ' 4 Thus, as late as 1929, the Board
of Tax Appeals seemed uncertain about the validity of a Treasury
regulation providing that the collection of a debt previously
charged off as worthless must be included in income.5 Within a
few months, however, the Board of Tax Appeals accepted the
principle enunciated by this regulation;6 by 1931, it was described
as a principle that "seems to be taken for granted, as indeed it
must be"; 7 and it has been a basic part of the federal income tax
structure ever since.
In recent years the tax benefit rule has been applied to nu-
merous areas of taxation. First a product of case law, it was em-
bodied in the Internal Revenue Code thirty-five years ago in
section 111, but it has refused to be confined by statute or code
section. Its most well-documented recent extension has been in
the area of corporate liquidations under sections 336 and 337.8
3. Ordinarily a deficiency may not be assessed more than three years after the
due date of the return. See I.R.C. § 6501(a).
4. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (quoting Stratton's Indepen-
dence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913)).
5. Treasury Regulation 62, article 51, T.D. 3295, 24 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV. 230-
31 (1922) (issued pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1921), carried forward the principle
previously enunciated by Treasury Regulation 33, article 125 (1914) (promulgated
under the Act of October 3, 1913). See Liberty Ins. Bank v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A.
1428, 1434 (1929) (validity of regulation not decided, because the earlier deductions
were erroneous when taken and hence subject to correction only by deficiency assess-
ment which was barred by statute of limitations), rel'd, 59 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1932)
(estoppel theory).
6. Excelsior Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 886 (1929). Given the
reservation expressed by the Board of Tax Appeals in Liberty Ins. Bank v. Commis-
sioner, 14 B.T.A. 1428 (1929), it is surprising to discover that the taxability of the
recovery was accepted without discussion in Excelsior Printing.
7. Putnam Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d 158, 158 (5th Cir. 1931).
8. Broenen, The Tax Benit Rule and Sections 332, 334(b)(2) and 336, 53 TAXES
231 (1975); Epstein, The Tax Beneft Rule in Corporate Liquidations, 6 TAX ADVISOR
454 (1975); O'Hare, Application of Tax Benefit Rule in New Case Threatens Certain
Liquidations, 44 J. TAX. 200 (1976); O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and
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But the tax benefit rule has also found application in noncorporate
taxation areas outside those explicitly mentioned by section 111
and has spawned related concepts along the way both through
court decisions and statutes. As a result, the tax advisor needs to
be aware of the principles underlying the rule, and alert to its ap-
plication in new areas.
This Article adduces the considerations that justify the tax
benefit rule's existence. Next, the Article distinguishes the exclu-
sionary and inclusionary aspects of the rule. It then identifies the
areas where the application of the tax benefit rule is now settled
and those where its applicability remains debatable, pointing out
the limitations on the rule and the formulations for its application
which result from the mixture of case law and single-issue statutes
which are the sources from which it has developed.
I. RATIONALES
Although the taxability of recovered amounts that were pre-
viously deducted rests primarily on judge-made rather than statu-
tory law, the courts have not devoted much attention to its
rationale and, when they have felt impelled to explain the princi-
ple, have not expounded wholly consistent theories. Thus, in Na-
tional Bank of Commerce v. Commissioner,9 involving a bank's
collection of loans to customers that had been deducted as bad
debts, the court said that the deduction converted the claims from
capital investments to potential income to be taxed if collected:
With regard to the recoveries made by petitioner on the debts
previously charged off . . . the question as to the taxability
thereof is: were they recoveries of capital? The Sixteenth
Amendment of the Constitution authorizes Congress to levy
taxes on "incomes, from whatever source derived". Such in-
come is said to be "the gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both combined". Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207
[(1920)]. Money received from the conversion of capital repre-
sented by something other than money is not income within the
meaning of the amendment, although a gain on the conversion
is.
When [they] made loans of their capital, the repayment of
the money lent was not income to the banks, although the inter-
est paid by the borrower for the use of the capital was. Such
interest, less whatever deductions may be permitted by statute,
is the amount upon which the tax is computed. However, when
such a loan becomes worthless, the amount thereof is loss of
the Overriding Principle of the Tax Beneft Rule in the Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders, 27 TAx L. REV. 215 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Nonrecog-
nition]. See Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378 (6th
Cir. 1978).
9. 115 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1940).
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capital, but the income tax laws permit the bank to recoup its
capital by deducting from the profits or income the amount of
the loss. Thus the bank does not pay a tax on all its income, but
on the amount of income less the loss on the worthless debt.
The debt itself then loses its nature as capital, but represents
that portion of the income which was not taxed, and the capital
is the money taken from the profits or income. If the loan, after
being deducted from income, is paid, then the lender is receiv-
ing profit or income-otherwise the lender would double its
capital on one transaction. In other words, the profits or in-
come used to pay back the capital when the debt is charged off
is represented by the worthless loan, so that when such loan is
paid the profits are replaced.' 0
Less elaborate than this imputed transubstantiation of capital
into income is the "balancing entry" theory, whose premise is that
the taxpayer's income over the long haul can be correctly com-
puted only by requiring a recovery to be included in gross income,
if the debt or other item was deducted in a prior year. Thus, in a
case involving taxpayer's recovery of an amount that was embez-
zled and deducted in a prior year, the Board of Tax Appeals said:
"The Commissioner has added no more to income [in the year of
recovery] than has been deducted previously, thus bringing the
amount of income reported over the period in balance with the
actual income of the taxpayer for this period.""II Acknowledging
that the recovery of stolen funds is "compensation for loss" rather
than income in the usual sense, the Board pointed out:
[T]he courts and this Board have been fully conscious of the
fact that losses will some times be deducted where the future
will eventually disclose compensation, and there will be re-
ported as income that which is in fact only compensation for
loss. But the deductions are practical necessities due to our in-
ability to read the future, and the inclusion of the recovery in
income is necessary to offset the deduction.'
2
In a later opinion, the Board of Tax Appeals observed even more
bluntly that in order to reflect income accurately for the entire
period, the taxpayer must make an adjustment "during the taxable
year in which actually no income was received" (that is, the year
of the recovery) because of the discovery in that year that the ear-
lier deduction, though reasonable when taken, was unnecessary. '
3
10. Id. at 876-77. The amounts in question were not collected by the lending
banks, but by their successor in interest, which was held by the court to occupy their
status for this purpose.
11. South Dakota Concrete Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 1429, 1431
(1932).
12. Id. at 1432.
13. Barnett v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 864, 867 (1939) (restoration of depletion
deducted on receipt of advance royalty on lease, where no production occurred).
[Vol. 26:265
HeinOnline -- 26 UCLA L. Rev. 268 1978-1979
TAX BENEFIT] ULE
Still another rationale is based on a theory of waiver or estop-
pel:
I think that it must be agreed that the repayment of a debt
is a return of capital. To my mind, no process of reasoning can
make it anything else. Being in fact capital, it does not become
income merely because it is not returned as agreed or when
expected, or even if the owner concludes in his own mind that
he will never get it again. To justify a tax upon the repayment
of a debt by referring it to the statutory definition of gross in-
come would undoubtedly extend the statute beyond the consti-
tutional powers of Congress.
But a taxpayer may voluntarily submit to an otherwise ille-
gal or unconstitutional imposition, and, if it is a condition of
some benefit which is tendered to him, his acquiescence will be
assumed or implied from his acceptance of the benefit. Deduc-
tions allowed by law from gross income are not matters of right
but of grace. When a taxpayer claims and is allowed a bad
debt against his taxable income there is no difficulty in finding
an implied consent to be taxed in respect of future recovery of
the bad debt, whether or not it is actually income. Whether this
be called an implied agreement of waiver for valid considera-
tion or an estoppel, is not of great importance.
14
While divergent, these theories share the notion that the re-
coveries do not constitute economic gain in the ordinary sense,
and that their inclusion in income is an anomaly requiring an ex-
planation. The premise, evidently, is that a creditor's collection of
an amount owed to him does not increase his net worth, even if he
previously concluded that the debtor would never pay, and that a
homeowner who receives a partial refund of his local property tax,
following recomputation of his liability in the light of newly dis-
covered evidence, would not ordinarily think that this was an in-
come producing event. Thus the taxpayers in these cases are
treated as realizing income only because they deducted amounts
that, in the light of hindsight, exceeded their actual loss or cost.
In a perceptive recent comment, a Tax Court judge, viewing
the tax benefit rule "in its true character-as a necessary counter-
weight to the consequences of the annual accounting principle,"' 5
observed:
The need to assess and collect taxes at fixed and relatively
short intervals underpins the principle of taxation that transac-
tions which may possibly be subject to further developments
substantially altering their character for tax purposes should
nevertheless be treated as final and closed so that their tax con-
sequences can be determined. On the other hand, a taxpayer
should not be permitted to take advantage of this governmental
14. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Rothensies, 43 F. Supp. 923, 925 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
15. Munter's Estate v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 678 (1975) (concurring opin-
1978]
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exigency to establish a distorted picture of his income for tax
purposes. It is this countervailing consideration which
spawned the tax benefit rule. The most common, and most
nearly accurate, explanation of the rule is that it recognizes the
"recovery" in the current year of taxable income earned in an
earlier year but offset by the item deducted. 16
As a counterweight to the annual accounting principle, the
tax benefit rule expresses a preference, from the perspective of ac-
cretions to wealth, for transactional equality of tax treatment over
contemporaneous equality, that is, equality of treatment of tax-
payers within a single year. Consider, for example, taxpayers A
and B who in year one both take $10,000 deductions for uncom-
pensated casualty losses. Taxpayer A effects a tax saving from his
deduction but, because of other deductions, taxpayer B does not.
In year ten, A and B each recover $10,000 for their losses after a
protracted dispute with an insurance company. By linking up
events in years one and ten, the tax benefit rule produces
transactional equality between taxpayers A and B. On the other
hand, it produces contemporaneous inequality between A and B if
year ten is considered alone.
Moreover, as a device to achieve transactional equality, the
rule by no means insures that the tax on the recovery will be equal
to the tax savings attributable to the prior deduction. Since margi-
nal tax rates vary from year to year, particularly in the case of
individuals, the increased tax in the year of recovery will usually
either exceed or be less than the tax reduction enjoyed in the ear-
lier year; rarely will the two amounts coincide. With one short-
lived exception,' 7 however, the courts have been satisfied with the
16. Id. (citations omitted).
17. In Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1958), the Court of
Claims adopted an "exact tax benefit" rule, under which the recovery was taxed at the
rate that was applicable to the deduction; it later overruled this decision and accepted
the prevailing judicial view that the recovery is to be taxed at whatever rate is in effect
for the year of receipt. Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399
(Ct. Cl. 1967).
From 1954 to 1976, I.R.C. § 1342 reached a similar result for certain recoveries
of amounts paid as a result of a judicial decision in a patent infringement suit. Sec-
tion 1346 (in force from 1941 to 1976) was also comparable to the "exact tax benefit"
principle of the Perry case; it permitted taxpayers receiving a repayment of unconsti-
tutional federal taxes to choose between (a) excluding the receipt currently and
amending the earlier year's return to eliminate the deduction (despite the running of
the statute of limitations) and (b) reporting the recovery and paying the resulting tax.
Sections 1342 and 1346 were repealed by Title XIX (the "deadwood" provisions) of
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1901(a)(147)-(148), 90 Stat. 1788
(1976).
A model income tax statute drafted by an American Law Institute group pro-
posed to require the inclusion of all recoveries of deductible items, whether the de-
duction was taken or not, and, if a deduction was taken, whether or not it resulted in a
reduction of the taxpayer's tax, subject, however, to the taxpayer's option to reopen
the earlier year if the statute of limitations had not expired or if the amount exceeded
[Vol. 26:265270
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rough and ready adjustment that results from taxing the recovery
at whatever rate prevails in the year of recovery, and have not
insisted on exacting a tax equal to the amount saved by the tax-
payer in the earlier year.
Once the courts concluded that recovered amounts are taxa-
ble not because they increase the taxpayer's net worth but because
they are linked to a prior tax deduction, the door was opened to
taxpayer claims that a recovery should be taxed only if the deduc-
tion actually reduced the taxpayer's tax liability for the earlier
year, but not if he had enough other deductions to eliminate any
tax liability. As a limitation on the basic principle of taxing the
recovery of previously deducted items, this aspect of the tax bene-
fit principle had a checkered career in the courts for more than a
decade, and the IRS also wavered between accepting and rejecting
it.'8 In 1942, however, Congress gave it formal endorsement by
enacting the statutory predecessor of Internal Revenue Code sec-
tion 111, which excludes from gross income the recovery of certain
previously deducted items if the deduction "did not result in a
reduction of the taxpayer's tax" in prior years. Although section
111 accords this treatment explicitly only to the recovery of previ-
ously deducted bad debts, taxes (whether deducted or taken as a
credit), and "delinquency amounts" (primarily interest on past-
due taxes), the tax benefit principle is applied by regulations to a
much wider assortment of items.' 9
As employed since the enactment of section 111, the tax bene-
fit rule is "both a rule of inclusion and exclusion: recovery of an
item previously deducted must be included in income; that portion
of the recovery not resulting in a prior tax benefit is excluded. '20
Section 111 is addressed solely to the exclusionary aspect of the
tax benefit rule, as a shield for the taxpayer; but by necessary im-
plication it ratifies the judge-made inclusionary component of the
rule, as a sword for the government, without which there would be
specified dollar or percentage limits. ALl FED. INCOME TAX STAT. § X332 (Feb. 1954
Draft).
18. For the twists and turns in the judicial doctrines and administrative rulings,
see Tye, supra note 1, at 329.
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.111-I(a) (1960) (second sentence); see Part III infra.
20. Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 652, 664 n.10 (1976).
Sometimes both features of the rule are merged into a single formulation, as in
Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1, 3 (1970) ("the so-called tax benefit rule, i.e., that a
recovery of an item that has produced an income tax benefit in a prior year is to be
added to income in the year of recovery"). On other occasions, the exclusionary qual-
ification alone is described as "the tax benefit rule," as in Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp.
v. United States, 381 F. Supp. 399, 401-02 (1967), describing the tax benefit rule as a
"limitation" on the principle that the recovery of deducted items generates income.
But see Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1978) (referring to inclusionary aspect as "the" tax benefit rule); Rev. Rul. 77-67,
1977-1 C.B. 33 (referring to inclusionary aspect as "the" tax benefit rule).
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no raw material on which section 111 could operate. In the dis-
cussion that follows, the threshold issue of inclusion will be ex-
amined first, 2' and then the exclusionary aspect of the tax benefit
rule, which serves to qualify its inclusionary requirement, will be
discussed.
22
II. THE INCLUSION OF RECOVERED ITEMS
As discussed above, the inclusionary component of the tax
benefit rule comes into play when the taxpayer recovers2 3 an item
that would not be includible in income except for the fact that it
was previously deducted or credited24 in computing his federal in-
come tax liability for a prior year.25 Thus, it embraces a wide
range of receipts, of which the most important are the following:
1. Recoveries on bad debts. From a historical perspective,
the most common example of a recovery evoking applica-
tion of the tax benefit rule is the collection of a debt that
was previously deducted as worthless; this is probably still
the most common instance. Such a recovery is subject to
the tax benefit rule's inclusionary principle whether the
21. See Part II infra.
22. See Part III infra.
23. For problems in determining whether there has been a "recovery" to which
the inclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule applies, see Textron, Inc. v. United
States, 561 F.2d 1023, 1030 (1st Cir. 1977) (Bownes, J., dissenting) (suggestion that a
loss carryover is a recovery); Weyher v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 825 (1976) (on sale of
mortgaged property, seller recovered prepaid interest); Tennessee-Carolina Transp.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 440, 446 (1975), afd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978)
(expensed supplies were "recovered" by corporation when distributed to shareholders
in a corporate liquidation; extended dissent by seven judges); Treas. Reg. § 1.111 -
l(a)(2) (1960); Statutory Nonrecognition, note 8 supra.
24. Because the recovery of an amount that was taken as a credit is unusual, it is
common to describe the tax benefit rule as applicable only to prior deductions, but
Treasury Regulation § 1.11 1-1(b) (1960), recognizes that credits as well as deductions
are embraced by the tax benefit rule. The principal example is the recovery of a
foreign income tax that was used as a credit pursuant to § 901.
Other tax allowances may also serve as a foundation for the inclusionary aspect
of the tax benefit rule. Thus, in Keystone Nat'l Bank v. United States, 52 AM. FED.
TAX. REP. (P-H) 1511 (W.D. Pa. 1957), the taxpayer recovered embezzled funds that
had been omitted from income when received because they were secretly misappro-
priated by an employee; the court held that the tax benefit resulting from this inadver-
tent omission from gross income warranted inclusion of the recovery in gross income
when received. See also Alsop v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1961) (receipts
includible not because they represent a "recovery" of embezzled funds, but because
they became income to a cash basis taxpayer for the first time when received). An
alternate approach to these cases would treat the omission as the equivalent of includ-
ing the embezzled funds and deducting the same amount as a loss from theft.
For a case involving receipts in a year following an inventory write-down that
did not produce a full tax benefit, see Union Trust Co. v. United States, 173 F.2d 54
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 940 (1949).
25. For the recovery of items that could have been, but were not, deducted in
earlier years, see Boehm v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 553 (2d Cir.), afJ'd, 326 U.S. 287
(1945).
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prior deduction was based on complete or partial worth-
lessness. The rule does not apply to debts that were
charged off against a bad debt reserve, however, since in
this situation the debt itself was not deducted, and recov-
eries are credited to the reserve rather than taken into in-
come.
26
2. Tax refunds. Refunds of taxes (including interest or other
payments for delays or failures in filing returns or paying
taxes) that were previously deducted or credited are listed
by section 111 as items to which the exclusionary compo-
nent of the tax benefit rule applies; 27 and this carries the
clear implication that the inclusionary part of the rule also
applies to these items. Thus, they must be included in in-
come, except to the extent that the prior deduction or credit
produced no tax benefit.
3. Casualty losses. Casualty and other losses are deductible
only if and to the extent that they are not compensated by
insurance or otherwise. 28 If the right to compensation is
unknown, contested, or otherwise doubtful during the taxa-
ble year of the damage, however, the taxpayer is entitled to
deduct the loss when it occurs but must include in income
any subsequent recoveries.
29
4. Other losses. If a taxpayer deducts a loss on selling prop-
erty and subsequently recoups the loss in whole or in part
from the person from whom he bought the property (for
example, for misrepresenting its value or breaching a war-
ranty), or from another third party for misconduct injuring
the property, the recovery must be included in income.
30
5. Accrued liabilities abandoned by the creditor. After issuing
and deducting checks for such business expenses as wages,
supplies, and customer overcharges, taxpayers often find
that some checks are returned because the addressee cannot
be found or are not cashed by the payee. Unless subject to
a local escheat law, these unclaimed or abandoned items
cannot remain outstanding for tax purposes forever. The
inclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule requires them to
be taken into income, but the date when this is mandatory
is unclear.
3'
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(a)(1) (1960).
27. I.R.C. § Il l(b)(2)-(3).
28. I.R.C. § 165(a).
29. See Rev. Rul. 71-160, 1971-1 C.B. 75; Rev. Rul. 71-161, 1971-1 C.B. 76 (ben-
efits under Disaster Relief Acts of 1969 and 1970 are includible in income by taxpayer
who deducted casualty losses, subject to exclusionary rule of I.R.C. § I I l to extent
that deduction did not result in tax benefit); cf. Rev. Rul. 73-408, 1973-2 C.B. 15
(§ I I 1 not applicable in absence of prior deduction).
30. This is the only example given by the regulations of the "other items subject
to the rule of exclusion" that are governed by I.R.C. § I I l although not expressly
described therein. Treas. Reg. § l.lll-l(a)(1) (1960).
31. See Roxy Custom Clothes Corp. v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 851 (Ct. Cl.
1959) (income when accounts payable was credited to eliminate liability); Lime Cola
Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 593, 601 (1954) (income when amount was credited to
19781
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6. Unnecessary bad debt reserves. Taxpayers using the re-
serve method of providing for bad debts make periodic ad-
ditions to the reserve, which are deducted from income
under Internal Revenue Code section 166(c). As specific
debts become worthless, they are charged to the reserve,
32
and any subsequent recoveries are credited to the reserve;
and these adjustments affect the amounts to be added to the
reserve thereafter. If the reserve becomes unnecessary (be-
cause, for example, the taxpayer sells its receivables, or
changes from the reserve method to a direct charge-off
method), the balance in the reserve must be taken into in-
come, since the reserve was built up by prior deductions.
33
7. Cancellation of taxpayer's indebtedness. When a debt is
discharged for less than its face amount, the debtor ordin-
arily realizes income under United States v. Kirby Lumber
Co. 34 and later cases. If the discharged debt gave rise to a
tax deduction when it was incurred (for example, an ac-
crual basis taxpayer's liability for wages or business sup-
plies), then the Kirby Lumber principle overlaps the tax
benefit doctrine in certain respects.
The inclusionary component of the tax benefit rule applies to
the foregoing items because they involve the partial or complete
recovery of amounts that were previously deducted or credited. In
the absence of a prior tax allowance, however, the tax benefit rule
does not require the inclusion in income of recoveries that do not
increase the taxpayer's net worth. Thus, it does not embrace the
recovery of items that did not give rise to tax allowances when
paid or incurred, such as the refund of an amount paid for per-
sonal goods or services or a nondeductible tax (for example, the
federal income tax or a local real property tax paid by a taxpayer
who did not itemize his personal deductions) or the recovery of
long-lost property (for example, forgotten bank accounts or mis-
placed jewelry). These events do not generate income even if the
taxpayer views the recovery as a windfall because he never ex-
pected to see the items again. The same principle has been ap-
surplus); G.M. Standifer Constr. Corp. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 184 (1934), appeal
dismissed, 78 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1935) (income in year of settlement).
32. See Treas. Reg. § 1.111-I(a)(l) (1960).
33. See Arcadia Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 247 (9th Cir.
1962) (sale of business); S. Rossin & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 652 (2d
Cir. 1940) (shift to direct charge-off method); Geyer, Cornell & Newell, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 6 T.C. 96 (1946) (need for reserve terminated in prior year, not before the
court, when taxpayer abandoned line of business). Although § I ll does not apply to
the recovery of specific debts charged to a bad debt reserve, see Treas. Reg. § 1.111 -
i(a)(1) (1960), it is applicable when the reserve itself is includible in income because
the need therefore has ceased. See M & E Corp. v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 1276
(1946); Rev. Rul. 65-258, 1965-2 C.B. 94. See also Haynsworth v. Commissioner, 68
T.C. 703 (1977) (closing of subdivider's reserve for development expenses generates
income).
34. 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
[Vol. 26:265
HeinOnline -- 26 UCLA L. Rev. 274 1978-1979
TAX BENEFIT RULE
plied to the recovery of an amount that was not deductible when
paid because the taxpayer was an exempt organization at that
time.
35
It is not clear whether the inclusionary or exclusionary as-
pects of the tax benefit rule apply if the taxpayer claims a tax al-
lowance based on a status for which he would not have qualified if
his right to the recovery had been known when the status was de-
termined. For example, a taxpayer may claim a dependency ex-
emption of $1,000 on paying a grandchild's college tuition bill of
$5,000. If the taxpayer later receives a refund of $1,500 because
the bill was erroneously calculated, and would not have been enti-
tled to the exemption if only $3,500 had been paid at the outset, it
is not clear whether the refund must be included in income up to
the amount of $1,000 under the inclusionary principle, and, if so,
whether the exclusionary principle applies to exemptions that
were of tax benefit.36
The status of a recovered amount that was improperly de-
ducted is also problematical. If the error was apparent on the face
of the return, it has been held that the government's sole remedy is
to assess a deficiency for the deduction year, and, if the statute of
limitations has run, the IRS cannot seize upon a subsequent re-
covery and compel it to be included in income. 37 A contrary rule
would sanction an indirect recoupment by the IRS of its loss after
the statute of limitations ran on the earlier year, but this hardly
seems more objectionable than to allow the error to stand and also
exclude the recovery from income when received. The earlier re-
turn must be examined in order to determine whether the recov-
ered amount was properly deducted, since if it was properly
deducted, the recovery is taxable. Thus, an exclusion for amounts
that were improperly deducted is not a device to let sleeping dogs
lie. The courts have held that the taxpayer cannot rely on the im-
propriety of the deduction if the earlier return was either deliber-
ately or inadvertantly "misleading," and that the recovery can be
excluded only if the IRS should have known that the deduction
was erroneous. 38
35. California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 235 (Ct.
Cl. 1962); cf. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(3) (requiring the basis of property to be reduced by
depreciation for periods when the taxpayer was not subject to federal income taxa-
tion).
36. Similar questions can arise with respect to the right to file a head of house-
hold or surviving spouse return or deduct medical expenses, privileges that are re-
stricted to taxpayers who have a "dependent" within the" meaning of I.R.C. § 152.
37. Canelo v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 217, 226-27 (1969), aff dper curiam, 447
F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1971). The Tax Court relied in part on the inapplicability of I.R.C.
§§ 1311-1315, which mitigate the statute of limitations in certain circumstances.
38. Eg., Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 82, 89-91 (1971), aff'd
per curiam, 456 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972).
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In Boehm v. Commissioner,39 the Second Circuit held that an
amount received in settlement of a derivative stockholder's action
by a taxpayer whose stock could have been, but was not, deducted
as worthless in an earlier year was not includible in gross income
when received. The taxpayer had actually claimed a loss in the
earlier year but had abandoned the claim when it was disallowed
by the IRS. Not being based on an estoppel rationale, the opinion
is broad enough to exclude the recovery from income if the tax-
payer, though entitled to a deduction in the earlier year, failed to
claim it. A contrary rule would open the door, whenever a debt or
other item is collected after a long delay, to an assertion by the
IRS that it could have been deducted in an earlier year, and that
the current receipt is a taxable recovery unless the hypothetical
deduction would have produced no tax benefit. To be sure,
Boehm enables the unusually prescient taxpayer to refrain from
taking a deduction in a low-tax year in order to prepare the way
for a subsequent tax-free recovery, but the likelihood of this abuse
is slim, and it could be minimized by an exception for taxpayers
who deliberately forego a clearly proper deduction.
When the inclusionary branch of the tax benefit rule is appli-
cable, it is necessary to determine whether the taxable recovery
constitutes ordinary income or capital gain. In making this deter-
mination the courts often impress the character of the original
transaction on the recovery, rather than viewing it as an isolated
transaction. When employed, this relation-back doctrine taxes the
recovery as ordinary income if the earlier loss or expense was de-
ducted from ordinary income; conversely, the recovery can, and
usually does, constitute a capital gain if the earlier deduction was
a capital loss.
III. EXCLUSION OF ITEMS THAT WERE DEDUCTED WITHOUT
TAX BENEFIT
The exclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule, now embod-
ied in Internal Revenue Code section 111, qualifies the rule's in-
clusionary principle by excluding the recovery from income if,
and to the extent that, the earlier deductions or credits were of no
tax benefit. This result is achieved by a "recovery exclusion," de-
fined by section 11 l(b)(4) as the amount by which the deductions
or credits failed to reduce the taxpayer's taxes, less any exclusion
already allowed. Although section 111 (a) explicitly sanctions a re-
covery exclusion for only three categories of recoveries-bad
debts, prior taxes, and "delinquency amounts" (interest or other
amounts paid or accrued for delays or failures in filing tax returns
39. 146 F.2d 553 (2d Cir.), afrd on other issues, 326 U.S. 287 (1945).
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or paying taxes, etc.)-the regulations extend the same treatment
to "all other losses, expenditures, and accruals made the basis of
deductions," with the exception of deductions for depreciation,
depletion, amortization, or bond premiums. 40
In determining whether a recovered item produced a tax ben-
efit when it was deducted, the regulations assume that the deduc-
tion was used only if, and to the extent that, the taxpayer's income
exceeded his other deductions.4' This computational assumption,
along with other aspects of the exclusion sanctioned by section
111, can'be illustrated by the following examples, 42 which com-
pare the return as filed for the year when the recovered item was
deducted with a hypothetical return for the same year without any
section 111 items:
EXAMPLE A
Determination of Tax Benefit Attributable to Section III Items
A. 1977 Return as filed B. Recomputation of
(with deduction of 1977 return (with-
§ Il1 items) out deduction of
§ Ill items)
1. Gross income $25,000 $25,000
2. Less deductions:
a. Depreciation $20,000 $20,000
b. Section I1I items
(business bad debts
and taxes) 6,300
c. Personal exemption 750 750
d. Total deductions 27,050 20,750
3. Taxable income (loss) ( 2,050) $ 4,250
4. Adjustment under
section 172(d)(3) 750
5. Net operating loss
(used in 1975) ($ 1,300)
The purpose of the comparison in Example A is to determine
the amount (if any) of the tax benefit resulting from deducting the
recovered items. From the comparison, it can be seen that the
section 111 items, amounting in the aggregate to $6,300 (line 2b),
served to offset $4,250 of 1977 income (line 3, as recomputed) and
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(a) (1960); see note 46 infra.
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.111 - l(b)(3) (1960). For other ways of computing the presence
of tax benefit, see Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARV. L. REV. 129, 151-70
(1943); Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Tomorrow, 57 HARV. L. REV. 675,684-92 (1944).
42. This example is based on Treas. Reg. § 1.11 -1(b)(3) (1960) which, like the
revised example in the text, assumes that the reduction in taxable income attributable
to the § I I I items served to reduce actual tax liability. If the taxpayer in the example
was entitled to a credit for 1976 (e.g., for foreign income taxes subject to I.R.C. § 901)
so that no tax would have been payable for 1976 even if none of the § 11l deductions
had been available, the recovery exclusion would be $5,000 (ie., line 2b less line 5),
rather than $750.
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$1,300 of 1975 income (line 5); hence the "recovery exclusion" as
defined by section 11 l(b)(4) (in other words, the section 111 items
that produced no tax benefit) was the balance ($750), computed as
follows:
EXAMPLE B
Computation of Recovery Exclusion
6. Section 111 items (from line 2b of Example A) $6,300
7. Portion of section 11 items used to reduce 1977
taxable income (line 3, as recomputed) $4,250
8. Portion of section 11I items carried back
to reduce 1975 taxable income (line 5) 1,300
9. Total of section I II items deducted with
tax benefit (lines 7 plus 8) 5,550
10. Recovery exclusion $ 750
On the foregoing assumptions, if the taxpayer recovers $400
in 1979 in respect of the bad debts or taxes (line 2b of Example A),
this amount is excluded; and if $500 more is recovered in 1980,
$350 is excludible, and the balance ($150) is includible in income.
This method of computing the tax benefit attributable to the
recovery items is favorable to the taxpayer, since it assumes that
the recovered items were the last to be deducted. Moreover, this
presumption is buttressed, if the statute of limitations has run, by
the subsidiary presumption that all other deductions taken in the
earlier years were valid.43 Thus, the IRS cannot reduce or elimi-
nate the recovery exclusion by showing that the 1977 deduction
for depreciation (line 2a) was excessive to the extent of $750, even
though this possibility may have been disregarded when the 1977
return was audited because the deduction for the section 111 items
(line 2b of Example A) was clearly valid. On the other hand, the
taxpayer cannot introduce deductions, however valid, that were
not claimed on the earlier return to establish that deducting the
recovered item served no tax benefit. 44
The regulations provide that recoveries of deductions for de-
preciation, depletion, amortization, and amortizable bond premi-'
43. Query, however, whether a deduction that was improper on its face (e.g., a
personal exemption of a dollar amount larger than authorized by statute) must be left
intact.
44. First Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 209 (1954), affidper curiam, 221
F.2d 959 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 887 (1955) (exclusion allowable only if de-
duction of recovered item "did not result" in a tax reduction; exclusion not allowed
merely because deduction "would not have resulted" in a tax reduction had other
deductions been claimed). Cf. United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 21-27 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1973) (tax benefit rule inapplicable unless claimed losses
were actually deducted in prior year; contrary rule would require auditing old returns
on stale and inadequate evidence).
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ums are not subject to the "rule of exclusion. '45 The Code
explicitly requires the basis of property generating these deduc-
tions to be reduced by the "allowable" deductions (whether de-
ducted or not) and requires gain or loss on a disposition of the
property to be determined by reference to the basis so computed.
46
This leaves little room for an exclusionary principle that would
reduce the taxpayer's gain to take account of deductions that were
of no tax benefit. Thus, the sole statutory remedy for a taxpayer
incurring deductions for depreciation, amortization, and depletion
in a loss year is the net operating loss carryover authorized by
Internal Revenue Code section 172, which permits excess business
deductions to be used in any profitable year within the specified
carryover period.
The taxpayer cannot rely on section 111, but must look to the
net operating loss carryover for a remedy, in another important
category of cases which can be illustrated by a business venture
requiring expenditures for wages, supplies, and other deductible
items that exceed income in one year, followed by substantial re-
ceipts in a later year. Although the receipts flow from and in a
sense serve to recoup the expenditures, it has been held that they
cannot be excluded under section 111 even if the prior deductions
were of no tax benefit.4 7 In reaching this conclusion, the First Cir-
cuit relied on the annual accounting rationale of Burnet v. Sanford
& Brooks Co.,4 8 holding that taxable income is realized when pay-
ment is received under a long-term contract, even if the taxpayer
incurred a loss over the life of the project.
Since Sanford & Brooks was decided long before the enact-
ment of section 111, the case by itself sheds no light on the in-
tended scope of that provision; but if section 111 had been enacted
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.111-I(a) (1960).
46. I.R.C. § 1011(a) (basis for gain or loss); I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) (depreciation,
amortization, and depletion); I.R.C. § 1016(a)(5) (amortization of bond premium).
Deductions for other items (e.g., losses) reduce the taxpayer's basis only to the
extent of a "proper adjustment" under I.R.C. § 1016(a). To the effect that a basis
adjustment is not required if the deduction is of no tax benefit to the taxpayer, see
Ridge Realization Corp. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 508, 519-22 (1966). See also
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. United States, 52 AM. FED. TAX REP. (P-H) 1600 (D. Kan.
1956) (earlier improper write-down of certain bonds without tax benefit not properly
chargeable to capital account, hence unimpaired basis can be offset against sales pro-
ceeds in later year; but proper charge-off of a different debt reduced basis despite lack
of tax benefit, hence recovery is excludible under I.R.C. § IIl but no loss allowable
for remaining unrecovered amount).
47. United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039
(1973). See also Capitol Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936 (1958); Union Trust Co. v. United States, '173 F.2d 54 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 940 (1949) (similar result, but perhaps resting on inappli-
cability of I.R.C. § Ill to gain computed under I.R.C. § 1001).
48. 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
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to reverse the result reached in Sanford & Brooks, there would be
virtually no need for the elaborate provisions of section 172 (relat-
ing to the net operating loss carryover). For this reason, ordinary
business receipts for goods and services seem clearly outside the
scope of section 111, even if the expenses making these receipts
possible were deducted without tax benefit. On the other hand,
refunds and abatements of amounts paid or accrued for wages or
supplies qualify for exclusion if they were deducted without tax
benefit, since these receipts are "recoveries" within the meaning of
section 11 (a).
Because section 111 is concerned with the "recovery" of items
that were previously deducted or credited, a receipt must be
closely associated with the prior allowance to qualify for exclu-
sion. Thus, if in 1977 a taxpayer accepts property worth $3,000 in
settlement of a $5,000 claim and deducts the remaining $2,000 as a
bad debt, the transaction is closed. If the property is sold in 1978
for $5,000, the taxpayer's gain of $2,000 is not a "recovery" of the
bad debt and hence cannot be excluded under section 111 even if
the 1977 deduction produced no tax benefit.49 On the other hand,
if the taxpayer collects an additional $1,000 from the debtor in
1979 (for example, because the 1977 settlement was induced by
fraud), this receipt would qualify as a partial recovery of the 1977
deduction.
In addition to requiring the recovery of a previously deducted
item, section 111 presupposes that the recovery is received by the
taxpayer who took the deduction. This principle ordinarily bars
relief under section 111 when otherwise qualified items are recov-
ered by the original taxpayer's successor in interest (by liquida-
tion, merger, etc.), but this barrier is lifted by Internal Revenue
Code section 381(c)(12) for certain corporate liquidations and
other reorganizations.50 Moreover, since a partnership is treated
for most income tax purposes as a conduit, each partner takes into
49. Rev. Rul. 66-320, 1966-2 C.B. 37 (relying on Allen v. Trust Co., 180 F.2d 527
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950)). See also Waynesboro Knitting Co. v.
Commissioner, 225 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1955) (taxpayer received insurance policy on life
of embezzler in settlement of claim and deducted loss without tax benefit; held that
subsequent collection of insurance proceeds is taxable under I.R.C. § 101(a)(2) de-
spite tax benefit rule, because receipt of policy terminated the original transaction and
initiated a new and separate one); Sloane v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 254 (6th Cir.
195 1) (insufficient relationship between bad debt deductions and later receipts from
debtor for personal services to qualify latter for exclusion under I.R.C. § 11); Brut-
sche v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1034, 1066 (1976) (I.R.C. § Ill inapplicable; "no
showing that there has been a recovery of the same item that was deducted in the
prior years").
50. But see Ridge Realization Corp. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 508, 523-26 (1966)
(successor entitled to use I.R.C. § 11). See also Brutsche v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.
1034 (1976) (expressing doubt that recoveries by a Subchapter S corporation qualify
under I.R.C. § IIl if the deductions were passed through to the shareholders).
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account his distributive share of the firm's recoveries.5 l
IV. TAX DETRIMENT, REVERSE TAX BENEFIT,
AND RELATED PRINCIPLES
The tax benefit doctrine is not the only judicial and legislative
departure from the annual accounting principle enacted in order
to harmonize a transaction's tax consequences when it is finally
closed with its tax treatment in an earlier year.
Internal Revenue Code Section 1341, among other analogies
to the tax benefit rule, is applicable when a taxpayer must refund
$3,000 or more that was included in income in an earlier year
when he apparently had an unrestricted right to receive and retain
it. In the year of repayment, the taxpayer is permitted by section
1341 to pay the lesser of (a) a tax computed in the usual fashion
after deducting the refunded amount, or (b) a tax computed in the
usual fashion on his other income (before deducting the refunded
amount) minus the tax detriment suffered in the year when the
refunded amount was received and included in income. This "tax
detriment" approach guarantees that the tax saved by deducting
the refunded amount will be at least as great as the tax paid when
the item was received.
2
If the taxpayer prefers to take the deduction in the usual way
in the year of repayment (the first branch of the option just de-
scribed), however, the deduction allowable under section 1341 is
limited by what might be termed a "reverse tax benefit" rule,
which serves to protect the government against a deduction that is
excessive when compared with the amount included in income in
the earlier year. This limitation was applied by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Skel/y Oil Co., 53 involving deductions
claimed when the taxpayer refunded overcharges collected from
customers in earlier years on sales of natural gas. Because the
sales gave rise to deductions for percentage depletion equal to
27.5% of the amount received, so that taxable income was in-
creased by only 72.5% of the receipts, the Court held that only
72.5% of the amount refunded could be deducted.
In so holding, the Court suggested that the decision would
''affect only a few cases" because percentage depletion is "quite
unusual [in that] it allows a fixed portion of gross income to go
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)(8), T.D. 7192, 1972-2 C.B. 307.
52. As pointed out in note 17, supra, at one time the Court of Claims interpreted
the inclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule to require a comparable result, in that
the tax attributable to a recovery was not to exceed the tax saved in the earlier year
when the recovered item was deducted.
53. 394 U.S. 678 (1969) (divided court).
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untaxed" 54 and it cited, with seeming approval, a Tax Court case
involving a similar refund, in which, after adjusting for percentage
depletion, the court allowed the taxpayer to deduct the balance
even though the earlier receipts were included in income in a loss
year for which no tax was payable. 5 On the other hand, the
Court said in Skely Oil that it could not "believe that Congress
intended to give taxpayers a deduction for refunding money that
was not taxed when received," 56 which implies a broader scope for
this "reverse tax benefit" principle than the Court was prepared to
acknowledge.
V. RECOVERIES OF FOREIGN EXPROPRIATION LOSSES
Under Internal Revenue Code section 135 1, enacted in 1966,
a domestic corporation receiving money or property in respect of
a foreign expropriation loss may elect to exclude the recovery
from gross income, up to the amount of the allowable deductions
for the loss in prior taxable years.57 In return for excluding the
recovery, an electing corporation must pay an additional tax equal
to the increased taxes for the loss years attributable to decreasing
the deductions for the loss by the amount of the recovery. Section
1351 thus results in a tax liability comparable to the amount that
would have been due if the recovery had been predicted when the
expropriation occurred and had been applied to reduce or elimi-
nate the deductible loss, 58 except that the tax rate prevailing in the
recovery year is used rather than the rates in force in the loss
years. If the recovery exceeds the prior deductions, the excess is
treated as gain from an involuntary conversion of property which
54. Id. at 686.
55. O'Meara v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 622, 632-35 (1947). The IRS asserted that
inclusion of the income in the year of receipt "brought the Government no tax bene-
fit," but this may have meant only that no tax was paid in thatyear. Id. at 632. Since
inclusion of the receipts in that year's gross income reduced the taxpayer's net operat-
ing loss, thereby reducing the amount carried over to other years, the government
may in fact have realized a "tax benefit" in those years.
For a painstaking analysis of Skelly Oil and its implications, see Rabinovitz,
Effect of Prior Year's Transactions on Federal Income Tax Consequences of Current
Receipts or Payments, 28 TAX L. REV. 85 (1972).
56. 394 U.S. at 685.
57. For an extended explanation of§ 1351, see S. REP. No. 1091, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2101. Sections
1331-1337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (formerly § 127 of the 1939 Code),
dealing with recovery of World War II losses, were repealed in 1976 by Title XIX
("deadwood provisions") of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,
§ 1901(a)(145), 90 Stat. 1788 (1976). See also I.T. 4086, 1952-1 C.B. 29 (losses in-
curred in Korean War not covered by § 127 of 1939 Code, but may be deductible
under other provisions, e.g., as losses incurred in business or transactions entered into
for profit).
58. Compare the "exact tax benefit" rule, created, but soon abandoned, by the
Court of Claims. See note 17 supra.
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qualifies for nonrecognition if the conditions of Internal Revenue
Code section 1033, relating to the replacement of converted prop-
erty, are satisfied.
Since it is elective, section 1351 offers the taxpayer a choice
between the normal tax benefit rules, under which prior deduc-
tions remain in force but recoveries are taxable if the deductions
produced tax benefits, and a special rule, under which the recov-
ery is excluded but the prior deductions must be disgorged.
Domestic corporations that do not avail themselves of section
1351 are subject to Internal Revenue Code section 80, under
which securities deducted as worthless because of a foreign expro-
priation (as defined) must be included in gross income if their
value is restored in whole or in part, up to the pr:ior deductions
resulting in a tax benefit. Amounts includible under section 80 are
taxed as ordinary income unless the correlative loss was taken into
account as a loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset.59
VI. DAMAGES FOR ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS, PATENT
INFRINGEMENTS, AND BREACH OF CONTRACT OR
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS
Inspired by tax benefit principles, Internal Revenue Code
section 186 promulgates a special rule applicable to damages re-
covered for injuries attributable to antitrust violations, patent in-
fringements, and breaches of contract or fiduciary obligations.60
To the extent of the taxpayer's "unrecovered losses" (defined by
section 186(d) as those net operating losses attributable to the in-
jury that could not be deducted in any carryover year), the dam-
ages, if included in gross income, are allowed as a deduction.
The regulations prescribe in some detail the method of deter-
mining whether a particular year's net operating loss is attributa-
ble to an injury subject to section 186.61 Since the exclusionary
aspect of the normal tax benefit doctrine would permit damages to
be excluded from gross income on proof that they constituted a
recovery of prior deductions that produced no tax benefit, the
principal contribution of section 186 lies in its simplified method
of determining whether the taxpayer received a tax benefit in prior
59. For a more detailed explanation of§ 80, see S. REP. No. 1091, note 58 supra;
Rev. Rul. 76-41, 1976-1 C.B. 52 (no worthless security loss for securities pledged to
and seized by a foreign government, if domestic parent can regain expropriated secur-
ities through judicial proceedings in United States); Rev. Rul. 75-501, 1975-2 C.B. 69
(expropriation of operating assets of domestic corporation's wholly owned domestic
subsidiary, which owns a bank account in the United States and whose certificates are
located here, does not render the securities worthless).
60. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 278 (1969), reprintedin [1969] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2315.
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.186-1(d)(3)-(4) (1972).
1978l
HeinOnline -- 26 UCLA L. Rev. 283 1978-1979
UCLA LAW REVIEW
years for the subsequently compensated injury. By concentrating
on the taxpayer's net operating loss, section 186 makes it unneces-
sary to associate the damages with any specific deductions.
CONCLUSION
Through the evolutionary development of a common law of
taxation as well as by small statutory steps, the tax benefit rule has
grown from an obscure relief provision for bad debt recoveries
into a rule with many applications. Despite its inexactitude and
various forms, the rule reflects a concern with equality of tax treat-
ment for transactions which transcend the boundaries of a single
taxable year. In a recent decision applying tax benefit principles
to an event that did not entail a conventional "recovery" of items
previously deducted, the Sixth Circuit expressed the view that the
"rule should be applied flexibly in order to counteract the inflexi-
bility of the annual accounting concept [and] whenever there is an
actual recovery of a previously deducted amount or when there is
some other event inconsistent with that prior deduction."62 This
generalization may imply a more imperial corrective role than the
doctrine is destined to play, but it surely points in the right direc-
tion.
62. Tennessee-Carolina Transp. Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378, 382 (6th
Cir. 1978) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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